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Abstract
We investigate the dynamics of political systems in a framework where transitions are
driven by reforms and revolts, and where political systems are a priori unconstrained, ranging
continuously from single-man dictatorships to full-scale democracies. The dynamics are
governed by the likelihood of transitions and their outcome, which are both determined
endogenously. We find that reforms and revolts result in extreme political systems—reforms
by enfranchising the majority of the population leading to democracies, and revolts by
installing autocracies. Reinforcing this polarization, extreme political systems are persistent
across time: Democracies are intrinsically stable, leading to long episodes without political
change. Autocracies, in contrast, are subject to frequent regime changes. Nevertheless they are
persistent, since ensuing revolts lead to autocracies comparable to their predecessors. Taken
together, our results suggest that the long-run distribution of political systems is bimodal
with mass concentrated on the extremes. The dynamics are consistent with cross-country
data.
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1 Introduction
How do political systems evolve over time? Which political systems are persistent? And
what types of political systems should we expect to see in the long-run? Thinking about
such questions requires thinking about the inherent dynamics of political systems.
While there is now a growing economics literature exploring causes and circumstances
of regime changes, its primary focus has so far been on explaining specific patterns of
regime changes, initiated through either reforms or revolts. The unfolding dynamics
of political system have, however, so far been largely restricted from the outset, if not
abstracted from entirely, typically by restricting either the transition mechanism or
the set of originating and emerging political systems. This paper takes a step towards
overcoming these limitations, placing the dynamic process that describes the evolution
of political systems at the center of analysis.
Building on the previous literature, we construct a model that focuses on reforms
and revolts as political transition mechanisms, but generalizes the environment to
explore a substantially enriched space of a priori attainable dynamics. In particular,
our model is based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) in that agents with access to
political power (“political insiders”) may conduct preemptive reforms to alleviate the
threat from revolts initiated by “political outsiders”. To allow the model dynamics to
unfold in an essentially unconstrained way, we augment our framework to meet the
following three criteria:
(1) To ensure that the dynamics are potentially driven by both reforms and revolts,
we introduce an information asymmetry regarding the regime’s vulnerability to a
revolt that creates a signaling role for reforms. In equilibrium, this leads insiders to
sometimes take “tough stance” rather than to negotiate on moderate reforms in light
of revolutionary pressure, guaranteeing the co-existence of reforms and revolts along
the equilibrium path. The likelihood of either type of transition (or, equivalently, the
stability of a particular political system) is thereby endogenously determined by the
equilibrium.
(2) We set up the model so that in principle the whole spectrum of political
systems, ranging from single-man dictatorships to full-scale democracies, may emerge
in equilibrium. Hereby we follow the literature in that we characterize political systems
by the fraction of the population having access to political power.1 Reforms and
1Regimes where political power is concentrated in the hands of small elites are, e.g., Chile (1973–
90) and today’s North Korea. In contrast, the majority of the population is enfranchised in most
1
revolts are both implemented such that a priori a continuum of political systems may
emerge from each of them, with the outcome being endogenously determined by the
equilibrium. Specifically, as in the majority of previous works, we model reforms as
franchise extensions and assume that, after successful revolts, its supporters form the
new regime. Deviating from the literature, we, first, allow for franchise extensions of
arbitrary scope and, second, explicitly model revolts as the outcome of a coordination
game among heterogeneously adjusted outsiders that equally allows for revolts of
arbitrary scope.
(3) Finally, being interested in the dynamics of political systems, we set up the
model to allow for repeated transitions and avoid to force it to eventually reach an
absorbing state. Owing to the first two criteria, consecutive transitions can be both
monotonic and non-monotonic.
Results In equilibrium, the model dynamics are characterized by a Markov process
that can be decomposed into two underlying mappings: First, each political system maps
to an equilibrium likelihood for either type of transition to occur. Second, conditional
on the political system in place, either type of transition maps in turn to a specific
distribution over newly emerging political systems. Characterizing the model dynamics
is thus equivalent to answering two questions. First, which types of political systems
arise from reforms and which arise from revolts? And second, how frequently does
either type of transition occur given the political system in place?
The model’s answer to the first question is that reforms and revolts lead to a
polarization of political systems. While revolts result in “autocracies” in which a
minority of the population has access to political power, reforms enfranchise the
majority of the population and establish “democratic” political systems. These findings
hold independent of the originating regime. In contrast, intermediate types of political
regimes do not arise along the equilibrium path, so that emerging political systems tend
to be extreme.
An interesting implication of these results is that democracies are only established
from within regimes. This gives theoretical support to a long-standing view in political
science according to which former autocratic elites are key actors in the establishment of
democracies (Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1973; Huntington, 1991). Or, as
Western democracies. Regimes between the two extremes, where parts of the population is deprived
from political rights in an otherwise inclusive system, are, e.g., Hungary (1921–31) and Madagascar
(1960–72).
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Karl (1990, p. 8) puts it: “no stable political democracy [in South America] has resulted
from regime transitions in which mass actors have gained control, even momentarily,
over traditional ruling classes”.
The second question above was concerned with the conditional likelihood of regime
changes, or, equivalently, the stability of political systems. Here, our model predicts that
democratic regimes are intrinsically stable in the sense that there is a low conditional
likelihood of either type of transition. In contrast, autocracies are subject to frequent
transition events—both, via revolts or reforms. This is in line with the empirical
literature on regime stability, which observes that democratic political systems are
significantly more stable than autocratic ones (Przeworski, 2000; Gates et al., 2006;
Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010).2
With the dynamic process at hand, we simulate our model to explore the “long-run”
properties of political systems. The key prediction is that the characteristic Markov
process integrates to an invariant distribution that tends to be bimodal with mass
concentrated on extreme political systems. There are thus two sets of political systems
that (while not necessarily being absorbing) are predicted to be frequently observed in
the long-run.
To see the logic behind this result, note that the polarizing effect of reforms and
revolts ensures the emergence of (only) extreme political systems along the equilibrium
path. For certain types of political systems to have significant mass in the long-run, they,
however, need both to emerge with positive probability and to be persistent. From the
above discussion, it is apparent why democracies are persistent: Facing a low conditional
likelihood of either type of transition, democracies are stable and long-lasting.
For autocracies the case is more subtle. Given that autocracies face a high conditional
likelihood of regime changes, we have that individual autocracies are relatively short-
lived. Nevertheless, our simulations suggest that despite their instability, autocratic
systems are persistent across time. Precisely because autocracies are characterized by a
high conditional likelihood of revolt, political change is frequently initiated by a small
group of insurgents, resulting in autocracies very similar to their predecessors. Hence,
while the identity of autocratic leaders may change frequently, autocratic systems tend
to persist across regimes.3
2From these results it follows that the mode of transition—peaceful reforms or violent revolts—is
important for the characteristics of the resulting regimes. For transitions to democracy, a similar point
has been highlighted by Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2012, forthcoming), who show that consensual
transitions foster civil liberties and property rights provision in contrast to violent transitions.
3As a corollary, the same logic implies that revolts are serially correlated across time, because they
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Figure 1. Distribution of political systems since World War I. Notes: The figure displays the result
of a kernel density regression. Data based on the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).
Political systems are normalized to range from 0 (extremely autocratic) to 1 (extremely democratic).
Units of observation are country-days.
To evaluate how our predictions reconcile with the data, we construct a dataset
on political systems and transitions including the majority of countries from 1919
onwards.4 On an aggregate level, the empirical distribution of political systems since
World War I, depicted in Figure 1, matches the predicted bimodal shape. Towards
the end of the paper, we use the constructed dataset to take a preliminary look at the
empirical counterparts to the two components constituting the Markov process that
defines the model dynamics. The exercise suggests that the dynamic process identified
by our model is also at work in the data.
Related literature Our paper relates to a growing economics literature on exploring
the causes and circumstances of regime changes. In particular, the preemptive logic
behind reforms in our paper is based on the seminal rational for why autocratic regimes
may want to conduct democratic reforms put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000b) (see also, e.g., Conley and Temini, 2001; and Boix, 2003).5 More closely related
constitute a selection into politically instable regime types.
4Specifically, we proxy for political systems using the Polity IV database, and use data from the
Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders and the Comparative Constitutions Project to identify transition
events linked to changes of political systems. See Section 5 for details.
5A related strand of the democratization literature argues that reforms may also be reflective of
situations where autocratic decision makers are better off in a democratized political system than
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to our paper are a few theoretical studies that allow for preemptive reforms to co-exist
with non-democratic transitions along the equilibrium path (e.g., Acemoglu, Ticchi and
Vindigni, 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a; and Ellis and Fender, 2011). Specifically,
the latter two of these papers relate to ours in that they choose similar approaches to
motivate the co-existence of reforms and revolts via asymmetric information.6 All of
these paper do, however, abstract from repeated transitions, which are at the core of
our contribution.
In this respect, our paper relates more closely to Acemoglu and Robinson (2001),
who allow for counter-coups in response to newly established democracies, but restrict
the space of political systems to two predetermined systems from the outset. Similarly,
Justman and Gradstein (1999), Jack and Lagunoff (2006), and Gradstein (2007) allow
for multiple (possibly gradual) extensions of the franchise, but do not allow for political
change to be initiated from political outsiders via revolts.7 To the best of our knowledge
this is the first paper that allows for both reforms and revolts along the equilibrium
path, without restricting their outcomes from the outset. As argued above this is central
to our analysis, enabling us to endogenously derive the properties of these transition
mechanisms in order to characterize the dynamic process governing the evolution of
political systems.
Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and outlines the strategic determinants driving
policy choices in equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the law of motion and derives
the main predictions regarding the equilibrium dynamics. Section 5 compares our
theoretical findings with the data, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are confined to
Appendix A.
under the status quo (e.g., Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; and Llavador
and Oxoby, 2005). On the empirical side, Aidt and Jensen (2012) and Przeworski (2009) provide
evidence that suggests that preemptive reforms are indeed the driving force behind democratization.
In a similar spirit, Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2012) show both theoretically and empirically
that a higher risk to lose political power induces leaders to conduct constitutional reforms.
6Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) and Edmond (2013) also explore how decision makers may
strategically manipulate information that affects the outcome of a coordination game in the context of
the global games literature. While outsiders in our model share the same posterior beliefs, our model
relates to those papers at a methodological level in that it uses heterogeneous opportunity costs as an
equilibrium selection device that takes essentially the same role as heterogeneous information does in
the global games literature.
7Another set of papers that is broadly related includes Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008, 2012),
who characterize the set of stable coalitions or regimes when political status does not act as a
commitment, but largely abstract from transitions.
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2 The model
We consider an infinite horizon economy with a continuum of two-period lived agents.
Each generation has a mass equal to 1. At time t, fraction λt of the population has the
power to implement political decisions, whereas the remaining agents are excluded from
political power. We refer to these two groups as (political) “insiders” and “outsiders”.
When born, the distribution of political power among the young is inherited from
their parent generation; that is, λt agents are born as insiders, while 1− λt agents are
born as outsiders. However, agents who are born as outsiders can attempt to overthrow
the current regime and thereby acquire political power. To this end, outsiders choose
individually and simultaneously whether or not to participate in a revolt.8 Because all
political change will take effect at the beginning of the next period (see below), only
young outsiders have an interest in participating in a revolt. Accordingly, we denote
young outsider i’s choice by φit ∈ {0, 1} and use the aggregated mass of supporters,
st =
∫
φit di, to refer to the size of the resulting revolt.
Given the mass of supporters st, the probability that a revolt is successful is given
by
p(θt, st) = θth(st), (1)
where θt ∈ Θ is a random state of the world that reflects the vulnerability of the
current regime or their ability to put down a revolt, and h is an increasing and twice
differentiable function, h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], with h(0) = 0. That is, the threat of a revolt
to the current regime is increasing in the mass of its supporters and in the vulnerability
of the regime. When a revolt has no supporters (st = 0) or the regime is not vulnerable
(θt = 0), it fails with certainty.
The purpose of θt in our model is to introduce asymmetric information between
insiders and outsiders that, as will become clear below, explains the prevalence of revolts
along the equilibrium path. Formally we have that the state θt is uniformly distributed
on Θ = [0, 1], is i.i.d. from one period to the next, and is revealed to insiders at the
beginning of each period. Outsiders only know the prior distribution of θt.
After they learn θt, insiders may try to alleviate the threat of a revolt by conducting
reforms. We follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) by modeling these reforms as an
8For notational convenience, we abstract from the possibility of insiders participating in a revolt.
In Appendix A.1 we show that this is without loss of generality, since within our framework it is never
optimal for insiders to support a revolt against fellow members of the regime.
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extension of the franchise to outsiders, which is effective in credibly preventing them
from supporting a revolt.9 However, since our model is aimed at endogenizing the
political system λt, we generalize this mechanism by allowing insiders to continuously
extend the regime by any fraction, xt − λt, of young outsiders, where xt ∈ [λt, 1] is the
reformed political system.10 Because preferences of insiders will be perfectly aligned,
there is no need to specify the decision making process leading to xt in detail.
Given the (aggregated) policy choices st and xt, and conditional on the outcome of
a revolt, the political system evolves as follows:
λt+1 =
st if the regime is overthrown, andxt otherwise. (2)
When a revolt fails (indicated by ηt = 0), reforms take effect and the old regime stays in
power. The resulting political system in t+ 1 is then given by xt. In the complementary
case, when a revolt succeeds (ηt = 1), those who have participated will form the new
regime. Accordingly, after a successful revolt, the fraction of insiders at t+ 1 is equal
to st. Note that this specification prevents non-revolting outsiders from reaping the
benefits from overthrowing a regime so that there are no gains from free-riding in our
model.
To complete the model description, we still have to specify how payoffs are distributed
across the two groups of agents at t. As for outsiders, we assume that they receive
a constant per period payoff of γit which is privately assigned to each agent at birth
and is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We interpret this heterogeneity
of outsiders as different degrees of economical or ideological adaptation to a regime,
determining their propensity to revolt.
In contrast, insiders enjoy per period payoffs u(λt), where u is twice differentiable,
u′ < 0, and u(1) is normalized to unity. We think of u(·) as a reduced form function
that captures the various benefits of having political power (e.g., from extracting a
common resource stock, implementing preferred policies, etc.).11 One important feature
9In Appendix A.1, we show that it is indeed individually rational for enfranchised outsiders to not
support a revolt.
10By assuming xt ∈ [λt, 1] we are effectively ruling out reforms that withdraw political power once
it has been granted. This is in line with the idea that granting someone the status of an insider is a
credible and irreversible commitment in the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b).
11More specifically, u should be interpreted as a value function where all policy choices that having
political power grants access to—except enfranchising political outsiders—are substituted by their
optimal policy rules. In particular, this applies to all question of how to organize the economy and
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of u is that it is decreasing in the current regime size and, hence, extending the regime
is costly for insiders (e.g., because resources have to be shared, or preferences about
policies become less aligned). Another thing to note is that u(λt) ≥ γit for all λt and
γit; that is, being part of the regime is always desirable. In the case of full democracy
(λt = 1) all citizens are insiders and enjoy utility normalized to the one of a perfectly
adapted outsider.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that members of an overthrown regime and
participants in a failed revolt are worst-adapted to the new regime. Formally, γit = 0,
resulting in a zero payoff.
For the upcoming analysis it will be convenient to define the expected utility of
agents that are born at time t, which is given by:
V I(θt, λt, st, xt) = u(λt) + [1− p(θt, st)]× u(xt), (3)
V O(θt, γit, st, φit) = γit + φit p(θt, st)× u(st) + (1− φit)× γit, (4)
where superscript I and O denote agents that are born as insiders and outsiders,
respectively. In both equations, the first term corresponds to the first period payoff
(unaffected by the policy choices of the young agent’s generation), while the other terms
correspond to second period payoffs. (Since agents do not face an intertemporal tradeoff,
we do not need to define a discount rate here).
The timing of events within one period can be summarized as follows:
1. The state of the world θt is revealed to insiders.
2. Insiders may extend political power to a fraction xt ∈ [λt, 1] of the population.
3. Observing xt, outsiders individually and simultaneously decide whether or not to
participate in a revolt.
4. Transitions according to (1) and (2) take place, period t+ 1 starts with the birth
of a new generation, and payoffs determined by λt+1 are realized.
inasmuch to reallocate resources from outsiders to insiders. Similarly, we also abstract from the
question of how exactly to enfranchise political outsiders (i.e., through which political institutions). In
abstracting from these issues, we are able to focus on the interplay of changing the inclusiveness of
political systems through reforms and through revolts in a tractable way. However, it is important to
note that all other policy choices still matter for our analysis in determining the shape of u. Some
discussion of how u may vary across different economies and an illustration of how variations in u
affect the dynamics of the political system is provided in Section 4.3.
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In what follows, we characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria that satisfy
the trembling-hand criterion (due to Selten, 1975); that is, perfect Bayesian equilibria
that are the limit of some sequence of perturbed games in which strategy profiles are
constrained to embody “small” mistakes.12 To increase the predictive power of our
model, we thereby limit attention to equilibria that are consistent with the D1 criterion
introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987), a standard refinement for signaling games. The
D1 criterion restricts outsiders to believe that whenever they observe a reform x′ that
is not conducted in equilibrium, the reform has been implemented by a regime with
vulnerability θ′, for which a deviation to x′ would be most attractive.13
Anticipating some equilibrium properties, we simplify our notation as follows. First,
outsiders’ beliefs regarding the regime’s vulnerability will be uniquely determined in
our setup. We therefore denote the commonly held belief by θˆt, dropping the index i.
Second, there are no nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria in our game (see the
proofs to Propositions 1 and 2). Accordingly, we restrict the notation in the main
text to pure strategies and introduce mixed strategies only to define the perturbations
required by trembling-hand perfection.
This leads to the following definition of equilibrium for our economy.
Definition. Given a history δ = {λ0}∪ {{φiτ : i ∈ [0, 1]}, θτ , xτ , ητ}t−1τ=0, an equilibrium
in this economy consists of policy mappings xδ : (θt, λt) 7→ xt and {(φiδ : (θˆt, xt) 7→
φit) : i ∈ [0, 1]}, and beliefs θˆδ(λt, xt) 7→ θˆt, such that for all possible histories δ:
a. Reforms xδ maximize insider’s utility (3), given states (θt, λt), beliefs θˆδ, and
perturbed policy mappings {ωkiδ : i ∈ [0, 1]} for all values of k;
b. Each outsider’s policy choice φiδ maximizes (4), given perturbed policy mappings
12Here, the concept of trembling-hand perfection rules out “instable” equilibria, in which st = 0, but
iteratively best-responding to a (perceived) second-order perturbation of st would lead to a different
equilibrium with a first-order change in st. For details see the proof of Proposition 1. Except for these
instabilities, the set of trembling-hand perfect equilibria coincides with the set of perfect Bayesian
equilibria in our model. An alternative (and outcome-equivalent) approach to rule out these instabilities
would be to restrict attention to equilibria which are the limit to a sequence of economies with a finite
number of outsiders, where each agent’s decision has non-zero weight on st.
13Formally, let V¯ I(θ′, λt) be the insiders’ payoff in a candidate equilibrium when the regime has a
vulnerability θ′. Then the D1 criterion restricts beliefs to the state θ′ that maximizes Dθ′,x′ = {θˆ :
V I(θ′, λt, s(θˆ, x′), x′) ≥ V¯ I(θ′, λt)}, where s(θˆ, x′) is the mass of outsiders supporting a revolt, given
the beliefs θˆ and reform x′. Dθ′,x′ is said to be maximal here, if there is no θ′′, such that Dθ′,x′ is
a proper subset of Dθ′′,x′ . That is, beliefs are attributed to the state in which a deviation to x
′ is
attractive for the largest set of possible inferences about the regime’s vulnerability (implying that the
regime gains most by deviating).
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σkδ , {ωkjδ : j ∈ [0, 1] \ i}, and corresponding beliefs θˆkδ for all values of k;
c. Beliefs θˆδ = limk→∞ θˆkδ (xt), where θˆ
k
δ are obtained using Bayes rule given σ
k
δ ; and
θˆδ satisfies the D1 criterion;
d. States (λt, ηt) are consistent with (1) and (2);
e. The perturbed policy mappings {{ωkiδ : i ∈ [0, 1]}, σkδ }∞k=0 are sequences of com-
pletely mixed strategy profiles converging to profiles that place all mass on
{φiδ : i ∈ [0, 1]} and xδ, respectively.
3 Political equilibrium
In this section, we derive the equilibrium strategies of insiders and outsiders, pinning
down the political equilibrium in the model economy. The dynamics of the model
economy implied by the equilibrium are investigated in Section 4.
Our analysis is simplified by the overlapping generations structure of our model,
which gives rise to a sequence of “generation games” between young insiders and young
outsiders. Since the distribution of political power at time t captures all payoff-relevant
information of the history up to t, the only link between generations is λt. We can
therefore characterize the set of equilibria in our model by characterizing the equilibria
of the generation games as a function of λt. All other elements of the history up
to time t may affect the equilibrium at t only by (hypothetically) selecting between
multiple equilibria (if the equilibrium in the generation game is not unique).
The generation game consists of two stages that determine the political system at
t+ 1. First, outsiders have to choose whether or not to support a revolt. Because the
likelihood that a revolt succeeds depends on the total mass of its supporters, outsiders
face a coordination problem in their decision to revolt. Second, prior to this coordination
problem, insiders decide on the degree to which political power is extended to outsiders.
On the one hand this will decrease revolutionary pressure along the extensive margin by
contracting the pool of potential insurgents. On the other hand, extending the regime
may also contain information about the regime’s vulnerability. As a result, reforms
may also increase revolutionary pressure along the intensive margin by increasing
coordination among outsiders who are not subject to reforms. Insiders’ policy choices
will therefore be governed by signaling considerations.
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We proceed by backward induction in solving for the equilibrium of the generation
game, beginning with the outsiders’ coordination problem.
3.1 Stage 2: Coordination among outsiders
Consider the outsiders’ coordination problem at time t. For any given belief, (θˆt, sˆt) ∈
Θ× [0, 1], individual rationality requires all outsiders to choose a φit that maximizes
their expected utility Et{V O(·)}.14 At time t, outsider i with adaptation utility γit will
therefore participate in a revolt if and only if
γit ≤ p(θˆt, sˆt)u(sˆt) ≡ γ¯(sˆt). (5)
Here γ¯(sˆt) is the expected benefit of participating in a revolt that is supported by a
mass of sˆt outsiders. Since γ¯(sˆt) is independent of γit, it follows that in any equilibrium
the set of outsiders who support a revolt at t is given by the agents who are least
adapted to the current regime. Suppose for the time being that γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1. Then, γ¯(sˆt)
defines the fraction of young outsiders that participates in a revolt, and, therefore, the
size of a revolt, st, that would follow from γ¯(sˆt) is given by
f(sˆt) ≡ (1− xt) γ¯(sˆt). (6)
Further note that in any equilibrium it must hold that st = sˆt. Therefore, as long
as γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1, the share of outsiders that support a revolt at t has to be a fixed point to
(6). To guarantee that this is always the case and to further ensure that a well-behaved
fixed point exists, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption A1. For ψ(s) ≡ h(s) · u(s),
a. ψ′ ≥ 0 and ψ′′ ≤ 0;
b. lims→0 ψ′(s) =∞.
Intuitively, Assumption A1 states that the participation choices of outsiders are
strategic complements; i.e., participating in a revolt becomes more attractive if the
total share of supporters grows. This requires that the positive effect of an additional
14Note that by our specification of p, V O is linear in θt. For the purpose of computing Et{V O},
θˆt ≡ Et{θt} is therefore a sufficient statistic for the full posterior distribution of θt. Henceforth we
refer to outsider’s beliefs accordingly by only keeping track of θˆt, disregarding any higher moments.
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supporter on the success probability outweighs the negative effect of being in a slightly
larger regime after a successful revolt. To ensure existence, we further require that
the strategic complementarity is sufficiently strong when a revolt is smallest, and is
decreasing as it grows larger.
Using Assumption A1, the above discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, the mass of outsiders supporting a revolt at time t
is uniquely characterized by a time-invariant function, s : (θˆt, xt) 7→ st, which satisfies
s(0, ·) = s(·, 1) = 0, increases in θˆt, and decreases in xt.
All formal proofs are in the appendix. Proposition 1 establishes the already discussed
tradeoff of conducting reforms: On the one hand, reforms reduce support for a revolt
along the extensive margin. In particular, in the limit, as regimes reform to a full-scaled
democracy, any threat of revolt is completely dissolved. On the other hand, if reforms
signal that the regime is vulnerable, they may backfire by increasing support along the
intensive margin.
3.2 Stage 1: Policy choices of insiders
We now turn to the insiders’ decision problem. Since more vulnerable regimes have
higher incentives to reform than less vulnerable ones, conducting reforms will shift
beliefs towards being vulnerable and, therefore, indeed stipulate coordination among
outsiders who are unaffected by reforms. This generates the tradeoff established in
Proposition 1, which is the main driving force behind the following result.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium, policy choices of insiders and beliefs of outsiders
are uniquely characterized by time-invariant functions x : (θt, λt) 7→ xt, ξ : θt 7→ ξt, and
θˆ : (λt, xt) 7→ θˆt, such that
x(θt, λt) =
λt if θt < θ¯(λt)ξ(θt) if θt ≥ θ¯(λt),
12
and
θˆ(λt, xt) =

θ¯(λt)/2 if xt = λt
θ¯(λt) if λt < xt < ξ(θ¯(λt))
ξ−1(xt) if ξ(θ¯(λt)) ≤ xt ≤ ξ(1)
1 if xt > ξ(1),
where ξ′ > 0 with ξ(θt) > λt + µ for all θt > θ¯(λt) and some µ > 0, and θ¯(λt) > 0 for
all λt.
Proposition 2 defines insiders’ policy choices for generation t as a function of (θt, λt).
Because the logic behind these choices is the same for all values of λt, we can discuss
the underlying intuition keeping λt fixed. Accordingly, Figure 2 plots reform choices
(left panel) and the implied probability to be overthrown (right panel), sliced along a
given λt plane. It can be seen that whenever a regime is less vulnerable than θ¯(λt),
insiders prefer to not conduct any reforms (i.e., xt = λt), leading to a substantial
threat for regimes with θt close to θ¯(λt). Only if θt ≥ θ¯(λt), reforms will be conducted
(xt = ξ(θt)), which in equilibrium effectively mitigate the threat to be overthrown,
ruling out marginal reforms where ξ(θt)→ λt.
To see why marginal reforms are not effective in reducing revolutionary pressure
consider Figure 3. Here we plot equilibrium beliefs (left panel) and the corresponding
mass of insurgents (right panel) as functions of xt. If the political system is left
unchanged by insiders, outsiders only learn the average state θ¯(λt)/2 of all regimes that
pool on xt = λt in equilibrium. On the other hand, every extension of the regime—how
small it may be—leads to a non-marginal change in outsiders’ beliefs from θˆt = θ¯(λt)/2
to θˆt ≥ θ¯(λt) and, hence, results in a non-marginal increase in revolutionary pressure
along the intensive margin. It follows that there exists some x˜(λt), such that for all
xt < x˜(λt) the increase of pressure along the intensive margin dominates the decrease
along the extensive margin. Thus, reforms smaller than x˜(λt) will backfire and increase
the mass of insurgents (as seen in the right panel of Figure 3), explaining why effective
reforms have to be non-marginal.
Furthermore, optimality of reforms requires that the benefit of reducing pressure
compensates for insiders’ disliking of sharing power. Because x˜(λt)− λt > 0, it follows
that u(x˜(λt)) − u(λt) < 0. Moreover, any reform marginally increasing the regime
beyond x˜(λt) leads only to a marginal increase in the likelihood to stay in power.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium beliefs and implied mass of insurgents.
Hence, there exists a non-empty interval, given by [x˜(λt), ξ(θ¯(λt))], in which reforms
are effective, yet insiders prefer to gamble for their political survival in order to hold on
to the benefits of not sharing power in case they survive. This explains the substantial
threat for regimes with θt close to θ¯(λt), as seen in the right panel of Figure 2.
15
15More precisely, gambling for survival increases the likelihood to be overthrown in two ways. First,
since at the margin more vulnerable regimes join the pool at xt = λt, these regimes obviously face a
high threat by not conducting reforms. Second, since these regimes also shift the pooling belief towards
pooling regimes being more vulnerable, the threat further increases for regimes of all vulnerabilities in
the pool.
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3.3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Propositions 1 and 2 uniquely pin down the policy choices in every state, which in
return determine the evolution of political systems. We conclude that there is no scope
for multiple equilibria in our model economy; if there exists an equilibrium, it must be
unique. Verifying the existence then permits us to reach the following conclusion.
Proposition 3. There exists an equilibrium, in which for all histories δ, policy map-
pings xδ and {φiδ : i ∈ [0, 1]}, as well as beliefs θˆδ correspond to the time-invariant
mappings given by Propositions 1 and 2. Furthermore, for any given initial political
system λ0, the equilibrium is unique.
4 Transition dynamics
We are now ready to investigate the dynamics of the model economy. By Proposition 3,
policy mappings are time-invariant, implying that (λt, θt) is a sufficient statistic for
characterizing the transition dynamics of the political system from time t to t + 1.
Integrating out θt, political systems in the unique equilibrium follow a Markov process
where the probability that λt+1 ∈ Λ can be decomposed into
Q(λt,Λ) = ρ
S(λt)×QS(λt,Λ) + ρR(λt)×QR(λt,Λ)
+ {1 − ρI(λt) − ρR(λt)} × 1λt∈Λ. (7)
Here ρS and ρR denote the probabilities that in state λt a transition occurs via revolts
or reforms; QS and QR are conditional transition functions (specifying the probability
that, in state λt, λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges from a revolt or reform); and 1 is an indicator
function equal to unity whenever λt ∈ Λ.16 Accordingly, the first term in (7) defines the
probability that state λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges through a revolt, the second term defines the
16Formally,
ρS(λt) =
∫ 1
0
p˘(θ) dθ
ρR(λt) =
∫ 1
θ¯(λt)
{1− p˘(θ)} dθ
QS(λt,Λ) = {ρS(λt)}−1
∫
θ:s˘(θ)∈Λ p˘(θ) dθ
QR(λt,Λ) = {ρR(λt)}−1
∫
θ:x˘(θ)∈Λ\λt {1− p˘(θ)} dθ,
where x˘(θ) ≡ x(λt, θ), s˘(θ) ≡ s(θˆ(λt, x˘(θ)), x˘(θ)), and p˘(θ) ≡ p(θ, s˘(θ)).
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probability that λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges from a reform, and the third term (roughly) refers to
the event of no transition.
Decomposing the law of motion into the likelihood maps ρS and ρR and conditional
transition “matrices” QS and QR is convenient for two reasons. First, it allows us
to identify the key forces driving the dynamics of political systems in terms of two
intuitively meaningful objects. Second, there exist direct empirical counterparts to the
model’s likelihood maps and conditional transition matrices, making it in principle
possible to investigate whether the forces that drive the dynamics of political systems
in the model are also at work in the data.
The next two subsections contain some qualitative characterizations of QS, QR, ρS,
and ρR. Section 4.3 then simulates the model to explore their interaction and to
investigate the long-run dynamics.
4.1 Outcome of transitions
Given the decomposition in (7) the type of political systems that emerge from transitions
are defined by the conditional transition “matrices” QS and QR. Inspecting the
equilibrium properties of our model, we get the following polarization result:
Proposition 4. For all states λt,
QR(λt, (
1
2
, 1]) = 1 and QS(λt, (0,
1
2
)) = 1;
i.e., reforms lead to majority regimes with λt+1 > 1/2 and revolts lead to minority
regimes with λt+1 < 1/2.
The first part of Proposition 4 states that any reform leads to a “democratic” system,
in which the majority of citizens holds political power. The intuition for this result
mirrors the one for Proposition 2. Because conducting reforms will be associated with
being intrinsically weak, coordination is increased along the intensive margin. For the
benefits along the extensive margin to justify these costs, reforms therefore have to be
far-reaching, inducing regimes to enfranchise the majority of the population whenever
they conduct reforms.
In contrast, the second part of Proposition 4 establishes that successful revolts always
lead to minority regimes, in which a small elite rules over a majority of political outsiders.
Underlying this result is that in equilibrium subversive attempts are conducted by only
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a small group of insurgents. Mass revolutions on the other hand are off-equilibrium. To
see what drives this, note that rationality of reforms requires them to be effective; i.e.,
revolts have to be largest when regimes abstain from reforms and choose to repress the
population. However, because abstaining from reforms is optimal for regimes both when
they are strong as well as when they hide their weakness through taking tough stance,
uncertainty about a regime’s weakness is largest from the perspective of outsiders
exactly when a regime abstains from reforms. Accordingly, prospects of revolting are
at most moderate and only those with large gains from winning political power (i.e.,
outsiders who are least adapted to the current regime) will find it rational to take the
risk of revolting.
An interesting implication of Proposition 4 is that democratic regimes arise if and
only if it is optimal for regimes to enfranchise former political outsiders. The commonly
made assumption in the previous literature that democracies are established by means of
reforms is thus an endogenous outcome of our model. The other channel through which
democracies could hypothetically emerge are mass revolutions. But we have just argued
that these are events off the equilibrium path. Our model thus supports a long-standing
view in political science according to which members of former autocracies are key
actors in the establishment of democracies, which is based on, e.g., the observation of
Karl (1990, p. 8) that no stable South American democracy has been the result of mass
revolutions (see also Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1973; Huntington, 1991).
Finally, note that from Proposition 4 it follows that there is a (possibly quite large)
open interval Λ¯ around 1/2, such that:
Corollary. Q(λt, Λ¯) = 0 for all λt.
That is, there is a range of intermediate regimes that are completely off the equilib-
rium path. In the simulation below, we will see that Λ¯ is typically quite large, leading
to a long-run distribution with mass only on the extremes.
4.2 Likelihood of transitions
The specific properties of ρS and ρR depend on the exact specification of u and are
investigated below. Here we identify a few limit properties that describe the stability of
the most extreme political systems.
Proposition 5. For λt → 1, ρS(λt) + ρR(λt)→ 0, where for all λt > λ¯, ∂ρS/∂λt < 0
and ∂ρR/∂λt ≤ 0. For all λt <
¯
λ, ρS(λt) + ρ
R(λt) > µ for some µ > 0, 1 >
17
λ¯ ≥
¯
λ > 0. Moreover if θ¯(0) < 1, then for all λt <
¯
λ and some {u¯,
¯
u} ∈ R2−,
∂ρS/∂λt < 0 and ∂ρ
R/∂λt > 0 if limλ→0 ∂u/∂λ <
¯
u, and ∂ρS/∂λt > 0 and ∂ρ
R/∂λt < 0
if limλ→0 ∂u/∂λ > u¯.
Proposition 5 implies that as regimes become more democratic, they eventually
become more stable (with ρS(1) = ρR(1) = 0). This is generally true for political
systems in which no reforms are conducted; and further holds for sufficiently democratic
regimes (λt > λ¯). For autocratic systems, in contrast, the likelihood of political change
is generally bounded away from zero (but does not necessarily have to be largest for
the most autocratic regime).
4.3 Simulation of long-run dynamics
We now simulate our model to explore the long-run dynamics of political systems. For
this, let
u(λt) = − exp(λtβ1) + β0 and h(st) = sαt .
To reduce the number of free parameters, further suppose that ψ′(1) = 0; i.e., the
strategic effect of an additional outsider supporting a revolt becomes negligible when
revolts are supported by the full population. Together with our assumptions on u and
h, this pins down α and β0 in terms of β1, which is restricted to approximately satisfy
β1 ∈ (0, 0.56).17
Interpreting u, one may think of β0 as a common resource stock or some other type
of private benefits that decline at an exponential rate β1 as power is shared with more
insiders. Hence, the larger β1 the larger the costs of enfranchising political outsiders.
In practice, these costs are expected to be high whenever members of the regime have
access to a large pool of exogenously given resources, or if there is a large degree of
economic and political inequality.18 If, on the other hand, aggregate income is generated
by a production process with strong complementarities between labor inputs or with
high returns to capital as in modern Western economies, enfranchising outsiders may
come at low costs. This is because enfranchising outsiders constitutes a commitment to
17The values implied for α and β0 are α = β1 exp(β1) and β0 = exp(β1) + 1, restricting β1 ∈
(0, exp(−β1)) ≈ (0, 0.56).
18In particular, u(λ) = − exp(λtβ1) + β0 = − exp(λβ1) + exp(β1) + 1 is increasing in β1 for all λ, so
that also the inequality between insiders and the average outsider,
∫
(u(λ)− γ) dγ, is increasing in β1
for all λ.
18
honor property rights of a larger share of the population and encourages them to acquire
human capital, to supply high-skilled labor, or to invest their savings. Accordingly,
u (which should be thought of as a value function, cf. Footnote 11) is expected to be
relatively flat for modern production economies, so that β1 is low.
In summary, when β1 is close to its upper bound, extending the franchise is costly
and the incentives to gamble for survival are strong. Consequently, for large β1, one
should expect to observe revolts frequently in equilibrium.19 On the other hand, if β1
is low, conducting reforms is cheap and one should expect political insiders to quickly
reform to a fully integrated society.
To give an overview of the model dynamics, Figure 4 displays a simulated time
series of the model for different values of β1 and for 500 periods each. For each time
path, we plot the political system, λt, at time t and indicate the dates where transitions
occur via revolts (marked by ∆) and reforms (marked by ×). It can be seen that low
costs of reforms in Setting 1 (β1 = 0.35) result in immediate democratic reforms and
the absence of successful subversive attempts. As the costs of reforms are increasing in
Setting 2 (β1 = 0.40) and Setting 3 (β1 = 0.45), successful revolts become more frequent
and are followed by periods of frequent regime changes, where autocracies succeed each
other. In contrast, democratic reforms give rise to long episodes of political stability.
Across settings, it can be seen that approximately two types of political systems
are emerging after transitions and are persistent across time. To highlight the model’s
working, we now briefly refine our previous characterization of QS, QR, ρS, and ρR given
our parametrization, before taking a closer look at their interplay and the long-run
dynamics of political systems.
Outcomes of transitions Figure 5 displays the distribution of political systems
that emerge from reforms and revolts for β1 = 0.4.
20 From the left panel, it becomes
apparent that approximately two types of autocracies emerge after revolts: dictatorships,
corresponding to regimes that emerge after revolts against democracies, and autocracies
19Given our interpretation of β1 above, a possible interpretation is a form of “resource curse” leading
to civil conflicts, similar to the views expressed in, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Ross (2001).
For a critical evaluation of the link between resource richness and civil conflict, see Haber and Menaldo
(2011).
20The reported distributions weight the conditional distributions QS(λt, λt+1) and Q
R(λt, λt+1)
with the invariant distribution of λt. E.g., letting Ψ denote the invariant distribution, the distribution
of political systems after reforms is given by
∫ 1
0
QR(λt, λt+1) dΨ(λt). While the long-run distribution
itself varies considerably with β1 (see Figure 8), the conditional distributions displayed here remain
largely unaffected by changes in β1.
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Figure 4. Simulated time series of the model economy. Notes: Reforms are marked by “×”, successful
revolts are marked by “4”. Costs of reforms (β1) are increasing from Setting 1 to 3.
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Figure 6. Likelihood of revolts and reforms (solid), and likelihood conditional on an associated change
in the political system ≥ 0.25 (dashed).
which emerge after succeeding other non-democratic regimes. The right panel, in turn,
displays the distribution of political systems after reforms, which only has positive weight
on fairly democratic political systems. In line with Proposition 4, transitions hence
lead to a polarization of regimes. In contrast, political systems reaching approximately
from 1/4 to 3/4 do neither emerge from reforms, nor from revolts.
Likelihood of transitions The simulations in Figure 4 indicate that autocratic and
democratic political systems differ significantly with respect to their stability. In line
with Proposition 5, democracies are characterized by long episodes without political
change, while autocracies are subject to frequent transitions. The underlying transition
probabilities are depicted in Figure 6. Here we plot the likelihood of political transitions
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via revolts (ρS) and reforms (ρR) as a function of λt (solid lines). It can be seen that
both mappings are decreasing in λt, such that autocracies are significantly more likely
than democracies to experience transitions of either type.
Long-run dynamics While the stability of individual political regimes is sufficiently
characterized by ρS + ρR, the “stability” (or persistence) of political systems is driven
by the interplay of QS and QR with ρS and ρR. Specifically, a transition at date t
can be seen as a “selection” into certain regime characteristics, which are, in our case,
fully defined by the conditional transition functions. Because those characteristics then
in turn determine the likely path of future transitions, this selection effect is key to
understanding which political systems are frequently observed in the long-run.
From ρS and ρR depicted in Figure 6 it follows directly that democracies persist
over time, because, once established, they merely face low likelihoods of any transition.
Autocracies, on the other hand, are relatively short-lived due to their high transition
probabilities. Nevertheless Settings 2 and 3 in Figure 4 illustrate a tendency for
autocracies to persist across regimes. This is because whenever an autocratic regime
transforms due to a revolt, the succeeding regime will be very similar to its predecessor,
as follows from the conditional distribution of political systems plotted in the left panel
of Figure 5. Hence, while the identity of autocratic leaders may change frequently,
autocratic systems tend to be persistent. To further illustrate this selection mechanism,
the dashed line in the left panel of Figure 6 depicts the likelihood of only those revolts
that are associated with a major regime change defined as |λt+1 − λt| ≥ 0.25. In line
with the discussion, revolts against autocracies have a zero probability of establishing a
radically different political system.21
A corollary to the last result is that revolts are serially correlated across time,
since they install regimes that themselves are likely to be overthrown. Conditional
on observing a revolt, the future path of the economy is thus likely to be “turbulent”
due to a selection into politically instable regime types, as it can be seen in the lower
panels of Figure 4. More directly, Figure 7 plots the likelihood of a revolt conditional
on observing a successful revolt s periods before (solid line). It can be seen that the
conditional likelihood is strictly above the unconditional likelihood of revolts (dashed
line) and is highest in periods following a revolt (when the likelihood of not having
experienced a reform in the meantime is highest).
21Since reforms are generally far-reaching, the probability of a major regime change in the right
panel of Figure 6 coincides with the probability of observing a reform (the solid line in the right panel).
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Figure 7. Likelihood of a successful revolt conditional on a revolt s periods before (solid) and
unconditional likelihood (dashed).
Finally, the polarization result above on the emergence of extreme political systems
lays the ground for an invariant distribution with mass only on the extremes. However,
for certain types of political systems to have significant mass in the long-run, they
need both to emerge and to be persistent. Figure 8 displays the invariant distribution
of political systems for different values of β1 obtained from running a kernel density
regression on simulated time series of 1 Million observations each.22 Whether political
systems are mostly democratic or autocratic thereby depends on the costs of reform as
given by β1. For low values of these costs (Settings 1 and 2), reforms are likely relative
to revolts such that mass is mainly concentrated on democratic systems. The converse
is true when the costs of conducting reforms are high (Settings 3 and 4).
22To retain a constant scale across all settings, we exogenously set a bandwidth = 0.05 in all settings.
Somewhat hidden by this is that in Setting 4 all mass is collapsed into a single mass point at λ = 0.12,
which in Setting 4 is absorbing. More generally, there are two scenarios under which a certain political
system can be absorbing. First, if ξ(1) = 1, then λ = 1 is reached in equilibrium, which is absorbing,
since by Proposition 5 ρS(1) = ρR(1) = 0. However, since ξ(1) < 1 in all of the reported settings, we
do not observe λ = 1 along any of the equilibrium paths. Second, if there exists a λ˜, such that θ¯(λ˜) = 1
and s(1/2, λ˜) = λ˜, then the system λ = λ˜ is locally attracting and absorbing (despite frequent regime
changes), as is the case in Setting 4.
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Figure 8. Invariant distribution of political systems. Note: Costs of reforms (β1) are increasing from
Setting 1 to 4.
5 A look at the data
The decomposition of the Markov process into ρS, ρR, QS, and QR allows us in principle
to compare the model’s dynamics at an interim stage to their empirical counterparts.
Comparing the model at an interim level ensures that, despite its somewhat abstract
nature, the model stands a “fair” chance to speak to the data. At the same time, the
level of comparison is sufficiently “disaggregated” to explore whether there is evidence
for the forces that drive the long-run dynamics in our model—namely, the interplay of
QS and QR with ρS and ρR—to also be at work in the data.
In this section, we construct a dataset, containing information on political systems
and transitions in the majority of countries from 1919 onwards in order to take an
exploratory look at the data along these lines.
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5.1 Data construction
As a measure for the inclusiveness of political system, we use the polity variable, scaled
to [0, 1], from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), which ranks political
regimes on a 21 point scale between autocratic and democratic. In order to examine
the model’s predictions, we combine this dataset with data on political transitions.
To classify successful revolts, we use the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders
(Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009). The dataset is available for the time period
between 1919 and 2004, such that we limit attention to political systems and transition
in these years. We record a successful revolt if a leader is irregularly removed from
office due to domestic popular protest, rebel groups, or military actors (defined by
Archigos’ exitcodes 2, 4 and 6), and if at the same time the leader’s successor takes
office in irregular manner (defined by an entrycode 1). Furthermore, we take a revolt
to be causal for a change in the political system if a change in the political system is
recorded in the Polity IV database within a two week window of the revolt.
Finally, we use the dataset on the Chronology of Constitutional Events from the
Comparative Constitution Project (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, 2010) to classify
reforms. We define reforms by a constitutional change (evnttype equal to new, reinstated,
or amendment) accompanied by a change in the political system (as indicated by the
variable durable from the Polity IV Project) that is not matched to a revolt or another
irregular regime change from the Achigos Dataset. To be consistent with the model’s
definition of reforms, we restrict attention to positive changes.23
The resulting dataset is a daily panel on the country level, which covers 175 countries
and records 251 revolts and 97 reforms.
5.2 Empirical properties of political systems and transitions
Table 1 summarizes the dataset. Panel A displays average political systems and
annualized empirical likelihoods for a transition of either type. On average, revolts
are observed with a frequency of 2.8 percent per year and country, and reforms are
observed with a frequency of 1.1 percent. This corresponds on average to a transition
every 25 years per country.
23In our data we record 49 instances where the political system becomes less democratic after a non-
revolutionary change in the constitution, compared to 97 instances where it becomes more democratic.
All of the following results are qualitatively robust to including these “negative” constitutional changes
in our definition of reforms.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Observations
A. Regimes
Political systems 0.493 0.376 3 289 400
Annual likelihood of a revolt
Unconditional 0.028 3 289 400
If polity ≤ 0.25 0.030 1 452 533
If polity ≥ 0.75 0.012 1 238 720
Annual likelihood of a reform
Unconditional 0.011 3 289 400
If polity ≤ 0.25 0.018 1 452 533
If polity ≥ 0.75 0.001 1 238 720
B. Transitions
Resulting political systems
After revolts 0.316 0.235 251
After reforms 0.672 0.242 97
Notes.— Units of observation in Panel A are country-days. Units of observation in Panel B are transitions.
The mean polity is given by 0.49—almost exactly the midpoint of the polity scale.
The standard deviation of political systems is, however, quite large. The reason for this
becomes clear in light of Figure 1 in the introduction, which displays the distribution of
political systems in our dataset: Only a minority of regimes are located in the middle
of the polity scale. Instead, in line with our predictions, most mass is concentrated
on extreme political systems. More precisely, 44 percent of all regimes are rather
autocratic with a polity index of 0.25 and below, while 38 percent of all regimes are
rather democratic with an index value of 0.75 and above.
In the remainder of the section, we examine the empirical counterparts of the condi-
tional transition functions, the likelihood maps, and the resulting long-run dynamics
discussed in the previous section.
Outcomes of transitions As predicted by Proposition 4 in our model, political
systems that emerge from reforms and revolts differ significantly in the data. This can
be seen, first, in Panel B of Table 1. Revolts lead to autocratic political systems with
a mean polity index of 0.32. Reforms, in contrast, lead to rather democratic political
systems with a mean index value of 0.63.
The same picture emerges when looking at the conditional distributions of the polity
index depicted in Figure 9 (the mirror image to Figure 5). Clearly, the vast majority of
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Figure 9. Empirical distribution of political systems after revolts and reforms; estimation by kernel
density regressions.
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Figure 10. Annual empirical likelihood of revolts and reforms (solid), and likelihood conditional on
associated change in the polity index ≥ 0.25 (dashed); estimation by local kernel regressions.
regimes resulting from revolts (left panel) are autocratic. Reforms, on the other hand,
by and large lead to democratic political systems, even though a non-negligible number
of less democratic systems are emerging after reforms as well.
A possible concern is that the observed correlations may be driven by cross-country
heterogeneity or time trends. To address this possibility, we estimate the change in the
polity index associated with revolts and reforms while controlling for country and year
fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are reported in Column 1 of Table 2. Using
only within-country variations, reforms are associated with significant increases in the
polity index of 0.44 points on average, hinting at sizable transitions towards democratic
systems as predicted by our model. Revolts, in contrast, are associated with statistically
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Table 2. Empirical results controlling for country and year fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable ∆ Polityt Revoltt Reformt Maj. Revoltt Maj. Reformt
Reformt 0.440
(0.025)
Revoltt −0.062
(0.016)
Polityt −0.000 −0.059 0.028 −0.049
(0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Control variables
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes.— All regressions are OLS. Number of observations are 3 289 400 country-days. Standard errors clustered at the
country level are reported in parentheses. With the exception of Column 2, all reported coefficients are significant at
the 1 percent level. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the change in the polity index at date t. The dependent
variables in Columns 2 to 5 are dummies indicating whether a revolt or reform is observed at date t, whereas the
dependents in Columns 4 and 5 are defined with the additional requirement that the associated change in the polity
index is not smaller than 0.25. Coefficients and standard errors in Columns 2–5 are multiplied by 365.25 to indicate
annual likelihoods.
significant reductions in the polity index by 0.062 points, resulting in (more) autocratic
systems.
Note that the difference in magnitude between the estimated coefficients of reforms
and revolts should be expected if the mechanisms identified in the model are also at
work in the data. Our model predicts that reforms always lead to transitions from
autocracies to democracies, implying large changes in the political system. Revolts, in
contrast, are predicted to initiate both, transitions from one autocracy to the next with
negligible changes in the political system as well as major political changes through
transitions from democracies to autocracies. The large effect of reforms compared to
the much smaller effect of revolts are thus consistent with the model predictions.
Likelihood of transitions Next, we take a look at the empirical likelihoods of
transitions. In line with our model’s predictions, the summary statistics in Table 1
suggest that democracies are significantly more stable than autocracies. Autocratic
political systems with a polity index below 0.25 are on average more than twice as likely
to be overthrown by a revolt than democratic political systems with a polity index
value above 0.75. Moreover, autocratic regimes are 18 times more likely to conduct
reforms than democratic regimes.
The solid lines in Figure 10 illustrate the relation between the transition likelihoods
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and the political regime in place (measured by the polity index) in more detail. It can be
seen that the likelihoods of reforms and revolts are hump-shaped, so that intermediate
political systems have the highest empirical likelihood of a transitions. Comparing
the stability of autocracies with democracies, there is a considerably difference in the
probability of reforms. The annual probability that a reform is conducted is between
one and two percent for autocracies and close to zero for democracies. While for revolts
the empirical likelihood also tends to be higher for autocracies than for democracies,
the difference is less striking.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report estimates on these relations where we again
control for country and year fixed effects. While there is no significant association
between the polity index and the probability of a revolt, full democracies (polity index
equals 1) are almost six percentage points less likely to experience a reform than the
most autocratic political regimes (index value of 0).
Long-run dynamics With the exception of perhaps the mapping from political
systems to the likelihood of revolts, the above results suggest that the likelihood maps
and conditional transition functions that drive the dynamics in the model are also at
work in the data. Accordingly, we should expect that also more “aggregate” properties
of the model’s dynamics can be seen in the data.
The first such feature identified by the model is the persistence of extreme political
systems. The dashed lines in Figure 10 indicate the empirical probability of observing
“major” transitions that are associated with a change in the polity index of at least
0.25 points. The resulting picture qualitatively resembles the corresponding likelihoods
of a major political change in the model (see Figure 6). Both in the data and in the
model revolts only lead to major changes in the political system when a democratic
regime is overthrown. Reforms, in contrast, lead to sizable regime changes in almost
all cases, but are conducted only when autocratic political systems are in place, again
resembling the conclusion from the model. A linear probability regression, in which
we only exploit within-country variation of the polity index and control for year fixed
effects, confirms these results. Sizable changes in the polity index are more likely to
be initiated via revolts for democratic political systems (Column 4 of Table 2) and via
reforms for autocratic political systems (Column 5 of Table 2).24
24The combination of revolts being likely against fairly autocratic systems but leading to sizable
changes in the polity index only when democratic systems are overthrown further supports the previous
interpretation of the small impact of revolts on the polity index through the lens of the model.
29
00.05
0.10
0.15
1 10 20 30
s
ρS
Figure 11. Empirical likelihood of a revolt conditional on a revolt s years before (solid) and
unconditional likelihood for all countries (dashed) and countries with at least one transition (dotted);
estimation by local kernel regression.
Second, we have seen in the model that the flipside of the selection mechanism that
causes the persistence of autocracies is a serial correlation of revolts. Given the above
evidence, we therefore expect that a similar serial correlation might be present in the
data as well. Figure 11 suggests that this is indeed the case. The solid line in Figure 11
reflects the likelihood of observing a revolt conditional on a successful revolt s years
before. This likelihood is considerably larger than the unconditional likelihood of revolts
across all countries (dashed line) and also compared to the unconditional likelihood in
countries with at least one observed transition (dotted line). Compared to the latter
benchmark, the difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for s ≤ 15.
Finally, we already have seen in Figure 1 in the introduction that the empirical
distribution of political systems across all countries and times is bimodal in the data,
supporting the predictions of the model.
6 Concluding remarks
While there is now a growing economics literature exploring causes and circumstances
of regime changes, the unfolding dynamics of political systems across time have so far
been largely abstracted from.
This paper makes a contribution towards filling this gap. To achieve this we develop
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a coherent dynamic framework of political transitions that has three key properties.
First, the model is “truly” dynamic, allowing for arbitrary transition paths via repeated
regime changes. Second, transitions are driven by both reforms and revolts along the
equilibrium path (whereas the likelihood of either transition type at any given point
of time is determined endogenously). And, third, political systems are determined
endogenously from a continuum of a priori possible system. Letting the forces that drive
transitions play out freely, we then study the dynamics implied by reforms interacting
with revolts.
Our findings suggest that transitions lead to a polarization of political regimes, giving
rise to autocracies after revolts and democracies after political reforms. Moreover, while
we find democracies to be stable, we find autocracies to be short-lived—characterized
by a high likelihood to observe either type of transition. Yet, a selection mechanism
gives rise to persistence of autocracies in the long-run as well as to autocorrelation
of revolts. As a result, the long-run distribution has mass concentrated on extreme
political systems.
To provide a first assessment of inasmuch the forces that drive the evolution of
political systems in the model are present in the data, we construct a dataset that
combines information on political systems and transitions for the majority of countries
since 1919. Looking at the empirical counterparts of the objects that drive the model’s
dynamics—the likelihood maps and conditional transition functions—we find evidence
that they indeed might also define the dynamics in the data. This observation is
further substantiated by finding a persistence of autocratic regimes, an autocorrelation
of revolts, and a bimodal distribution of political system in the data, which are all
predicted by our model. However, currently our evidence is only suggestive and it would
be useful to see further empirical investigations of the dynamics outlined in this paper.
Another open question that we have not pursued in this paper is to examine the
microfoundations of how the various benefits of having political power determine the
shape of insiders’ utility function u. In particular, following our discussion in Section 4.3,
the costs of sharing power are likely to vary across different economic environments—e.g.,
as we have argued resource-based endowment economies versus modern production
economies—and social institutions. As demonstrated in Figures 4 and 8, such variations
would then have important consequences for the types of political systems that are
common across different environments and times. Further exploring how cross-country
and intertemporal variations in u may explain differences in the dynamics of political
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systems is a promising direction for future research.
Finally, our analysis implied that revolutionary mass movements are events off the
equilibrium path. While from Figure 9 it can be seen that the majority of regimes that
emerge after successful revolts are indeed autocratic in the data, there is also a nonzero
mass of revolts leading to democratic regimes (around 10 percent). The only way one
can account for these events within our framework are strategic mistakes. For example,
the elite may erroneously signal weakness by making small concessions, or outsiders
may rally because of a commonly held belief that the regime is weak (for example due
to information cascades as in Kuran, 1989, or Lohmann, 1994). While it is possible that
socially costly mass revolutions are indeed the result of strategic mistakes, extending
the analysis by a rational explanation for the emergence of mass revolutions when the
regime has the power to counteract them via reforms is another interesting direction
for future research.
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Insiders never subvert, outsiders always join the regime
Insiders’ choice set includes xt ∈ [λt, 1]. It thus holds that (1−p(·, xt))u(xt) ≥ (1−p(·, 1))u(1) =
u(1) ≥ ψ(1) ≥ ψ(st) ≥ θˆtψ(st), where the first inequality follows from revealed preferences,
the second inequality follows from h(·) ∈ [0, 1], the third inequality follows from ψ increasing,
and the last inequality follows from θt ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, it is not attractive for any individual
insider to support a revolt against his own regime. As for outsiders we need to differentiate
two cases. First, outsiders that are targeted by a reform and would otherwise support a revolt
prefer to join the regime using exactly the same argument as above. Second, outsiders that are
targeted by a reform and would otherwise not support a revolt prefer to join the regime since
again by revealed preferences it holds that (1− p(·, xt))u(xt) ≥ (1− p(·, 1))u(1) = u(1) ≥ γit
for all i and t. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We first establish that any solution to the outsiders’ coordination problem is a fixed point to
equation (6). From our discussion in the main body of the paper it is clear that this is the
case if and only if γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1 for all sˆt. From Assumption A1 it follows that γ¯ is increasing in
sˆt, and therefore γ¯(sˆt) ≤ 1 holds if γ¯(1) = p(θˆt, 1)u(1) ≤ 1. Since u(1) = 1 and p(·) ∈ [0, 1]
this is indeed the case.
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Hence, consider any fixed point to (6). Since f(0) = 0 for all (θˆt, xt) ∈ Θ× [0, 1], there
always exists a fixed point at sˆt = 0. Whether or not sˆt = 0 is consistent with the concept of
trembling-hand perfection, and whether or not other fixed points exist, depends on the values
of θˆt and xt. We have to distinguish two cases.
First, if θˆt = 0 or xt = 1, then f(sˆt) = 0 for all sˆt, and therefore sˆt = 0 is obviously the
only fixed point to (6). To establish that sˆt = 0 is also trembling-hand perfect, it suffices
to show that for all i, φit = 0 is a best response to some sequence of totally mixed strategy
profiles {ωkjt : j ∈ [0, 1]\ i}∞k=0 that converges to the equilibrium profile where all i play φit = 0
with probability 1. Since for θˆt = 0 and xt = 1 playing φit = 0 is a (weakly) dominant strategy,
this is trivially true.
Second, consider the case where θˆt 6= 0 and xt 6= 1. In this case the fixed point at sˆt = 0 is
not trembling-hand perfect. To see this let zk = mini{ωkit(1)} denote the minimum probability
with which any agent i plays φit = 0 in the kth element of sequence ω
k
it. The requirement
of trembling-hand perfection that {ωkit} is totally mixed for all i and k implies that zk > 0
for all k. Hence, skt = (1 − xt)
∫
i ω
k
it(1) di ≥ (1 − xt) zk > 0. However, from h(0) = 0 in
combination with Assumption A1(b) it follows that for any skt > 0, γ¯(s
k
t ) = θˆtψ(s
k
t ) > 0 and,
hence, a strictly positive fraction of outsiders strictly prefers to choose φit = 1 in response
to {ωkjt : j ∈ [0, 1]}. We conclude that sˆt = 0 can not be supported in any trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium if θˆt 6= 0 and xt 6= 1.
Having ruled out sˆt = 0 as a solution to the coordination problem for θˆt 6= 0 and xt 6= 1,
we now show that there is a unique sˆt > 0 solving (6) for θˆt 6= 0 and xt 6= 1, which is
also consistent with the concept of trembling-hand perfection. From γ¯ ∈ [0, 1] it follows
that f is bounded by its support, [0, 1 − xt]. Moreover, by Assumption A1 we have that
limsˆ→0 ψ′(sˆ) = ∞, implying that limsˆ→0 f ′(sˆ) = ∞. Hence, there exists a s˜ > 0, such that
f(s˜) > s˜. Together with continuity of ψ (and thus of f), it follows that there exists a strictly
positive fixed point to (6), which by concavity of ψ (and thus of f) is unique on (0, 1].
Let s∗t = f(s∗t ) denote this fixed point. It remains to be shown that s∗t is consistent with
the concept of trembling-hand perfection. To show this, consider the following sequences
ωkit(1) = 1− εk for all i ∈ {j : γjt ≤ γ¯(s∗t )} and ωkit(1) = γ¯(s
∗
t )
1−γ¯(s∗t )ε
k for all i ∈ {j : γjt > γ¯(s∗t )},
with some {εk}∞k=0 such that limk→∞ εk = 0. Then, by construction,
skt = (1− xt)
(
(1− εk) γ¯(s∗t ) +
γ¯(s∗t )
1− γ¯(s∗t )
εk(1− γ¯(s∗t ))
)
= (1− xt) γ¯(s∗t ) = f(s∗t ),
and hence {φit : i ∈ [0, 1]} being mutually best responses implies that {φit : i ∈ [0, 1]} are best
responses to {ωkit : i ∈ [0, 1]} for all values of k.
The above arguments establish that st is uniquely determined by a (time-invariant)
function s : (θˆt, xt) → st. It remains to be shown that ∂s/∂θˆt ≥ 0 and ∂s/∂xt ≤ 0. Given
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that st is a fixed point to (6), we have that
pi(st, xt) ≡ st − (1− xt) θˆt ψ(st) = 0.
Implicit differentiation implies that
∂st
∂xt
= −θˆt ψ(st)×
(
∂pit
∂st
)−1
and
∂st
∂θˆt
= (1− xt)ψ(st)×
(
∂pit
∂st
)−1
,
where
∂pit
∂st
= −(1− xt) ∂γ¯
∂st
+ 1.
Since ψ is bounded by ψ(1) = 1, (6) implies that limθˆt→0 s
∗
t = limxt→1 s∗t = 0, and
therefore the case where θˆt = 0 or xt = 1 is a limiting case of θˆ 6= 0 and xt 6= 1. From
the implicit function theorem it then follows that s is differentiable on its whole support.
Moreover, the previous arguments imply that f(s˜) > s˜ for all s˜ < s∗t and f(s˜) < s˜ for all
s˜ > s∗t , implying that f ′(s∗t ) < 1 or, equivalently, ∂γ¯/∂st < (1−xt)−1 at s∗t . Thus ∂pit/∂st > 0
for all (θˆt, xt) ∈ Θ× [0, 1], which yields the desired results.
Finally, while we focus on pure strategies above, it is easy to see that the proposition
generalizes to mixed strategies. By the law of large numbers, in any mixed strategy equilibrium,
beliefs about s are of zero variance and, hence, the arguments above apply, implying that all
outsiders, except a zero mass i with γi = γ¯(s
∗
t ), strictly prefer φi = 0 or φi = 1. We conclude
that there is no scope for (nondegenerate) mixed best responses. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds by a series of lemmas. To simplify notation, in what follows we drop λt
as an argument of x and θˆ where no confusion arises. Furthermore, we use V˜ I(θt, θˆt, xt) =
(1− θth(st))u(xt) to denote insider’s indirect utility (up to a constant u(λt)), as follows from
st = s(θˆt, xt) given Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. x is weakly increasing in θt.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that x(θ′′) < x(θ′) for θ′ < θ′′. Let x′ ≡ x(θ′), x′′ ≡ x(θ′′), u′ ≡
u(x′), u′′ ≡ u(x′′), h′ ≡ h(s(θˆ(x′), x′)), and h′′ ≡ h(s(θˆ(x′′), x′′)). Optimality of x′ then requires
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that V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≤ V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′), implying u′h′ − u′′h′′ ≤ (u′ − u′′)/θ′ < (u′ − u′′)/θ′′,
where the last inequality follows from θ′ < θ′′ and u′ < u′′. Hence, V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≤
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′) implies that V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) < V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′), x′), contradicting optimality of
x′′ for θ′′.
Lemma 2. Suppose x is discontinuous at θ′, and define x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ′ + ε) and x+ ≡
limε↓0 x(θ′ + ε). Then for any x′ ∈ (x−, x+), the only beliefs consistent with the D1 criterion
are θˆ(x′) = θ′.
Proof. Let θ′′ > θ′, and let x′′ ≡ x(θ′′). Optimality of x′′ then requires that V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) ≥
V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) and, thus for any θ˜,
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) implies that
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) .
Moreover, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 1,
V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) implies that
V˜ I(θ′, θ˜, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x+), x+) .
Hence, if V˜ I(θ′′, θ˜, x′) ≥ V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x+), x+) = V¯ I(θ′′), then V˜ I(θ′, θ˜, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x+), x+) =
V¯ I(θ′). Therefore, Dθ′′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′,x′ if θ′′ > θ′. (For the definition of Dθ,x,
see Footnote 13.) A similar argument establishes that Dθ′′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′,x′ if
θ′′ < θ′ and, thus, the D1 criterion requires that θˆ(x′) = θ′ for all x′ ∈ (x−, x+).
Lemma 3. There exists θ¯(λt) > 0, such that x(θt, λt) = λt for all θt < θ¯(λt). Moreover,
x(θ′′) > x(θ′) > λt + µ for all θ′′ > θ′ ≥ θ¯(λt) and some µ > 0.
Proof. First, consider the existence of a connected pool at xt = λt. Because for θt = 0, xt = λt
dominates all xt > λt, we have that x(0) = λt. It follows that there exists a pool at xt = λt,
because otherwise θˆ(λt) = 0 and, therefore, p(·, s(θˆ(λt), λt)) = 0, contradicting optimality of
x(θ) > λt for all θ > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 1, x is increasing, implying that any pool must
be connected. This proves the first part of the claim.
Now consider x(θ′′) > x(θ′) for all θ′′ > θ′ ≥ θ¯(λt) and suppose to the contrary that x(θ′′) ≤
x(θ′) for some θ′′ > θ′. Since x is increasing, it follows that x(θ) = x+ for all θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′] and
some x+ > λt. W.l.o.g. assume that θ
′ is the lowest state in this pool. Then Bayesian updating
implies that θ+ ≡ θˆ(x+) ≥ (θ′ + θ′′)/2 > θ′ and, therefore, V˜ I(θ′, θ−, x+) > V˜ I(θ′, θ+, x+)
for all θ− ≤ θ′. Hence, because θ′ prefers x+ over x(θ−), it must be that x(θ−) 6= x+ for
all θ− ≤ θ′ and, hence, x(θ−) < x+ by Lemma 1. Accordingly, let x− ≡ maxθ−≤θ′ x(θ−).
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Then from continuity of V˜ I and θ+ > θ′ it follows that there exists an off-equilibrium reform
x′ ∈ (x−, x+) with V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x′) > V˜ I(θ′, θ+, x+). Hence, to prevent θ′ from choosing x′ it
must be that θˆ(x′) > θ′. However, from Lemma 2 we have that θˆ(x′) = θ′, a contradiction.
Finally, to see why there must be a jump-discontinuity at θ¯(λt) note that
V˜ I(θ¯(λt), θ¯(λt)/2, λt) = V˜
I(θ¯(λt), θ¯(λt), x(θ¯(λt))); otherwise, there necessarily exists a θ
in the neighborhood of θ¯(λt) with a profitable deviation to either λt or x(θ¯(λt)). From the
continuity of V˜ I and the non-marginal change in beliefs from θ¯(λt)/2 to θ¯(λt) it follows that
x(θ¯(λt)) > λt + µ for all λt and some µ > 0.
Lemma 4. x is continuous and differentiable in θt on [θ¯(λt), 1].
Proof. Consider continuity first and suppose to the contrary that x has a discontinuity
at θ′ ∈ (θ¯(λt), 1). By Lemma 1, x is monotonically increasing in θt. Hence, because x
is defined on an interval, it follows that for any discontinuity θ′, x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ′) and
x+ ≡ limε↓0 x(θ′) exist, and that x is differentiable on (θ′ − ε, θ′) and (θ′, θ′ + ε) for some
ε > 0. Moreover, from Lemmas 2 and 3 it follows that in equilibrium θˆ(x′) = θ′ for all
x′ ∈ [x−, x+]. Hence, V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) = V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x+), since otherwise there necessarily exists
a θ in the neighborhood of θ′ with a profitable deviation to either x− or x+. Accordingly,
optimality of x(θ′) requires V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x′) ≤ V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) and, thus, V˜ I(θ′, θ′, x−) must be
weakly decreasing in x. Therefore, ∂V˜ I/∂θˆt < 0 and limε′↓0 ∂θˆ(x− − ε′)/∂xt > 0 (following
from Lemma 3) imply that limε′↓0 ∂V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x− − ε′), x− − ε′)/∂xt < 0. Hence, a profitable
deviation to x− − ε′ exists for some ε′ > 0, contradicting optimality of x(θ′).
We establish differentiability by applying the proof strategy for Proposition 2 in Mailath
(1987). Let g(θ, θˆ, x) ≡ V˜ I(θ, θˆ, x) − V˜ I(θ, θ′, x(θ′)), for a given θ′ > θ¯(λt), and let θ′′ > θ′.
Then, optimality of x(θ′) implies g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≤ 0, and optimality of x(θ′′) implies that
g(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ 0. Letting a = (αθ′ + (1− α)θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), for some α ∈ [0, 1] this implies
0 ≥ g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ −gθ(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′))(θ′′ − θ′)− 12gθθ(a)(θ′′ − θ′)2,
where the second inequality follows from first-order Taylor expanding g(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around
(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) and rearranging the expanded terms using the latter optimality condition.
Expanding further g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around (θ′, θ′, x(θ′)), using the mean value theorem on
gθ(θ
′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), and noting that g(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = gθ(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = 0, these inequalities can be
written as
0 ≥ gθˆ(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) +
x(θ′′)− x(θ′)
θ′′ − θ′ × [gx(θ
′, θ′, x(θ′))
+ 12gxx(b(β))(x(θ
′′)− x(θ′)) + gθˆx(b(β))(θ′′ − θ′)] + 12gθˆθˆ(b(β))(θ′′ − θ′)
≥ −[gθθˆ(b(β′)) + 12gθθ(a)](θ′′ − θ′)− gθx(b(β′))(x(θ′′)− x(θ′)),
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for b(β) = (θ′, βθ′ + (1− β)θ′′, βx(θ′) + (1− β)x(θ′′)) and some β, β′ ∈ [0, 1]. Because V˜ I is
twice differentiable, all the derivatives of g are finite. Moreover, continuity of x implies that
x(θ′′)→ x(θ′) as θ′′ → θ′ and, therefore, for θ′′ → θ′,
0 ≥ gθˆ(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) + limθ′′→θ′
x(θ′′)− x(θ′)
θ′′ − θ′ gx(θ
′, θ′, x(θ′)) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 3, x and, hence, θˆ are strictly increasing for all θ ≥ θ¯(λt). Arguing similarly as we
did to show continuity, optimality of x, therefore, requires that gx = ∂V˜
I/∂xt 6= 0 and, hence,
the limit of (x(θ′′)− x(θ′))/(θ′′ − θ′) is well defined, yielding
dx
dθt
= − ∂V˜
I/∂θˆt
∂V˜ I/∂xt
. (8)
Lemma 5. x(θt, λt) = ξ(θt) for all θt > θ¯(λt), where ξ is unique and ∂ξ/∂θt > 0.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have that ξ is differentiable, and by Lemma 3, ∂ξ/∂θt > 0. We
thus only need to show that ξ is unique. By the proof to Lemma 4, dx/dθt is pinned down
by the partial differential equation (8), which must hold for all xt ≥ x(θ¯(λt)). Moreover,
whenever θ¯(λt) < 1, in equilibrium θˆ(x(1)) = 1 and, therefore, it obviously must hold
that x(1, λt) = arg maxxt V˜
I(1, 1, xt), providing a boundary condition for (8). Because V˜
I
is independent of λt, it follows that x(θt, λt) is uniquely characterized by a function, i.e.,
ξ : θt 7→ xt, for all θt ≥ θ¯(λt).
Lemma 6. θ¯(λt) is unique.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that θ¯(λt) is not unique. Then there exist θ¯
′′ > θ¯′, defining
two distinct equilibria for a given λt. By Lemma 5, there is a unique ξ(θ) characteriz-
ing reforms outside the pool for both equilibria. Optimality for type θ ∈ (θ¯′, θ¯′′) then
requires V˜ I(θ, θ, ξ(θ)) ≥ V˜ I(θ, θ¯′/2, λt) in the equilibrium defined by θ¯′, and V˜ I(θ, θ, ξ(θ)) ≤
V˜ I(θ, θ¯′′/2, λt) in the equilibrium defined by θ¯′′. However, V˜ I(θ, θ¯′/2, λt) > V˜ I(θ, θ¯′′/2, λt), a
contradiction.
This establishes uniqueness of x(θt, λt), with all properties given by Lemmas 3 and 5, and
the corresponding beliefs θˆ(λt, xt) following from Lemma 2 and Bayesian updating. Again,
for the purpose of clarity we have established this proposition by focusing on pure strategy
equilibria. In the following we outline how the proof generalizes to mixed strategy equilibria;
a detailed version of these steps can be attained from the authors on request.
Replicating the proof of Lemma 1, it is trivial to show that if V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′), x′) =
V˜ I(θ′, θˆ(x′′), x′′), then V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′), x′) < V˜ I(θ′′, θˆ(x′′), x′′) for all θ′ < θ′′ and x′ < x′′. It
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follows that (i) supports, X (θ), are non-overlapping, and (ii) minX (θ′′) ≥ maxX (θ′). More-
over, noting that x˜(θ) ≡ maxX (θ) has a jump-discontinuity if and only if type θ mixes in a
nondegenerate way, (ii) further implies that there can be only finitely many types that mix on
the closed interval [0, 1]. The logic of lemmas 2, 3, and 4 then apply, ruling out any jumps of
x˜ on [θ¯(λt), 1]. This leads to the conclusion that at most a mass zero of types (i.e., θt = θ¯(λt))
could possibly mix in any equilibrium (with no impact on θˆ) and, thus, there is no need to
consider any nondegenerate mixed strategies. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
From the discussion in the main body of the paper it is clear that the equilibrium is uniquely
pinned down by the time-invariant mappings given by Propositions 1 and 2 if it exists. We
are thus left to show existence, which requires us to verify that the equilibrium mappings are
consistent with the D1 and trembling-hand criterion. The first is a direct implication from
the proof of Proposition 2 where we apply Lemma 2 to restrict off-equilibrium beliefs, such
that θˆ is necessarily consistent with the D1 criterion.
To show consistency with the concept of trembling-hand perfection, we need to show that
{φi : i ∈ [0, 1]} and x are best responses to a sequence of completely mixed strategy profiles
{{ωki : i ∈ [0, 1]}, σk}∞k=0 that converge to a profile that places all mass on {φi : i ∈ [0, 1]} and
x, respectively.
Accordingly, for φi(θˆ
k(·, xt), xt) to be a best-response to xt and the perturbed strat-
egy profile {ωki : i ∈ [0, 1]} for the marginal outsider i with γi = γ¯(st), we need that
θˆk(·, xt)ψ(skt (xt)) = γ¯(st), requiring any change in beliefs along the perturbation path to
be offset by trembles of outsiders j 6= i. Because for x ∈ [ξ(1), 1], θˆ(·, x) = 1 can never
be sustained in a completely mixed equilibrium with a continuum of types, this implies
that we need to adjust for θˆk(·, x) < θˆ(·, x) by introducing asymmetric trembles, leading
to sk(x) > s(θˆ(·, x), x). Hence, let sk(x(1)) = s(x(1)) + εk for some {εk}∞k=0 such that
limk→∞ εk = 0 and εk ∈ (0, ε¯) for all k.
A necessary (and for θ ∈ (θ¯(·), 1) sufficient) condition for x ∈ [ξ(θ¯(·)), ξ(1)] to be optimal
against sk is that sk(x) satisfies the inverse differential equation (8) for x(·, θ) fixed,
dsk
dx
= −∂V
I/∂x
∂V I/∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=sk
, (9)
which in combination with sk(x(1)) pins down sk(x) for all x ∈ [ξ(θ¯), ξ(1)]. Note that
sk(x(1)) > s(·, x(1)) implies that sk(x) > s(·, x) for all x ∈ [ξ(θ¯), ξ(1)] since the indifference
condition (8) is unique. Moreover, since optimality of x requires that θ¯ is necessarily indifferent
between λt and ξ(θ¯), s
k(ξ(θ¯)) pins down sk(λt) > s(·, λt).
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For off-equilibrium x ∈ (λ, ξ(θ¯)) ∪ (ξ(1), 1] we are free to assign any sk(x) that (1)
assures optimality of x, and (2) converges to s(·, x). As to (1), we can for instance set
sk(x) = s(θ¯, x) + sk(ξ(θ¯))− s(·, ξ(θ¯)) for x ∈ (λ, ξ(θ¯)) (which is continuous around ξ(θ¯) and
has slope ds(θ¯, x)/dx ≥ dsk(ξ(θ¯))/dx, so that by (9) no type has an incentive to deviate),
and sk(x) = s(·, x) + εkfk(x) for x ∈ (ξ(1), 1] with some fk : [ξ(1), 1] → R+ such that
dfk(ξ(1))/dx = {dsk(ξ(1))/dx− ds(·, ξ(1))/dx}/εk and fk sufficiently convex for V I to be
concave on [ξ(1), 1], so that ξ(1) is the global optimum for θ = 1.
Note that these definitions imply that sk(x) ↓ s(θˆ(·, x), x) for all x and, hence, θˆk(·, x) ↑
θˆ(·, x) for all x as implied by the indifference condition of the marginal outsider, θˆk(x) =
γ¯(s(·, x))/ψ(sk(x)) ∈ (0, θˆ(·, x)). By construction, these sequences assure optimality of
{φi : i ∈ [0, 1]} and x along the perturbation path. To conclude the proof it therefore suffices
to show the existence of {{ωki : i ∈ [0, 1]}, σk}∞k=0 yielding {sk, θˆk}∞k=0.
Consider {sk}∞k=0 first. Define ε˜ such that maxx sk(x) < 1 − λ for εk = ε˜ and suppose
that ε¯ ≤ ε˜.25 Then any sk can be sustained by setting
ωki (1)(x) =
1− εk for all i : γi ≤ γ¯(s(θˆ(·, x), x))ck(x)εk for all i : γi > γ¯(s(θˆ(·, x), x)),
with ck(x) = {sk(x)− (1−εk)s(·, x)}/{(1−x)(1− γ¯(x))εk}. Note that ωki is completely mixed
if ε¯ < 1 and εkck(x) ∈ (0, 1) ⇐⇒ ck(x) ∈ (0, 1/εk) ⇐⇒ sk(x) + εks(·, x) < 1 − x. From
sk(x) > s(·, x) we have that ck(x) > 0 and because sk → s, using the same arguments as in
Footnote 25, there exists some εˆ such that ck(x) < 1/εk holds for all ε¯ ≤ εˆ.
Finally, consider {θˆk}∞k=0. It is straightforward to verify by Bayes rule that any θˆk with
θˆk(x) > 0 for all x can be sustained by setting
σk(x)(θ, ·) =

εk if θ > θˆk(x) and (x > λt or θ > θ¯t)
dk(x)εk if θ < θˆk(x) and x > λt
1−Rk(θ) if θ ≥ θ¯(λt) and x = ξ(θ)
T k if θ ≤ θˆk(λt) and x = λt
Zk if θ ∈ (θˆk(λt), θ¯(λt)) and x = λt,
with dk(x) = (1−θˆk(x))2/θˆk(x)2, Rk(θ) = ∫θ>θˆ(x) εk dx+∫θ<θˆ(x) dk(x)εk dx, T k = infθ<θ¯(λt)(1−
Rk(θ)), and Zk = {T kθˆk(x)2 + εk[2(1− θ¯(λt))θˆk(λt)− 1 + θ¯(λt)2]}/{θ¯(λt)− θˆk(λt)}2. With
a slight abuse of notation, in the definition of σk, Rk , T k and Zk denote probabilities,
25To see that ε˜ exists, note that s(θˆ(·, x), x) < 1− x ≤ 1− λt since otherwise γ¯t = 1, which requires
θ¯t = 1 and st = 1, contradicting that s is strictly decreasing in x. Convergence of s
k to s then implies
that one can always find some ε˜ that is sufficiently small.
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while εk are understood to be probability densities. Note that σk is completely mixed if
T k, Rk(θ) ∈ (0, 1) and Zk ∈ (0, Rk(θ)) for all θ. This is obviously true for some ε˘, such that
ε¯ < ε˘. Finally, note that the above definition is incomplete in the sense that Rk(θ) + T k < 1
or Rk(θ) + Zk < 1 for some types θ < θ¯(λt). In these cases the remaining probability mass
can be distributed (almost) arbitrary over atoms on (λt, 1] without impact on the resulting
beliefs.26
We conclude the proof by setting ε¯ = min{1, ε˜, εˆ, ε˘}. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider QR(λt, (
1
2 , 1]) = 1 first. By Proposition 2, for any reform xt > λt, xt = ξ(θt), with ξ
increasing. To show the claim, it thus suffices to show that x˜ ≡ ξ(θ˜) > 1/2 for θ˜ = minλ θ¯(λ).
Also, define λ˜ = arg minλ θ¯(λ). Then, optimality of x˜ implies s
∗ ≡ s(θ˜/2, λ˜) > s(θ˜, x˜) ≡ s∗∗.
Using (6),
s∗ = (θ˜/2)(1− λ˜)ψ(s∗) ≡ w∗ψ(s∗), (10)
s∗∗ = θ˜(1− x˜)ψ(s∗∗) ≡ w∗∗ψ(s∗∗). (11)
Note that, in analogue to the proof of Proposition 1, for a general wt ≡ θˆt(1−xt) it holds that
∂st
∂wt
= −ψ(st)
(
∂pit
∂st
)−1
> 0.
Hence, s∗ > s∗∗ implies w∗ > w∗∗, or (θ˜/2)(1− λ˜) > θ˜(1− x˜). Rearranging, then proves the
claim,
x˜ > 1− 1− λ˜
2
≥ 1
2
.
Now consider QS(λt, (0,
1
2)) = 1. Again, optimality of xt implies that s(θˆ(λt, x), x) is
decreasing in x. Hence, for all λt,
s(θˆ(λt, xt), xt) ≤ s(θ¯(λt)/2, λt) ≤ s(1/2, 0),
where the last inequality follows since s is increasing in its first and decreasing in its second
argument. Hence, it suffices to show that s(1/2, 0) < 1/2.
Let s∗ ≡ s(1, 0) ≤ 1 and let s∗∗ ≡ s(1/2, 0). From (6), s∗ = ψ(s∗) and s∗∗ = ψ(s∗∗)/2.
26For instance, we can dispose of the atomic waste without any hazard by having each type θ place
the remaining probability mass on x = λt + θ(1− λt)/θ¯(λt).
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Moreover, by Proposition 1, s∗ > s∗∗. Hence, since ψ is strictly increasing,
s∗∗ =
ψ(s∗∗)
2
=
ψ(ψ(s∗∗)/2)
2
<
ψ(ψ(s∗)/2)
2
=
ψ(s∗/2)
2
<
ψ(s∗)
2
=
s∗
2
≤ 1
2
.
Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
From Footnote 16,
ρS(λt) =
∫ θ¯(λt)
0
θh
(
s
(
θ¯(λt)/2, λt
))
dθ +
∫ 1
θ¯(λt)
θh (s (θ, x(θ))) dθ, (12)
and
ρR(λt) =
∫ 1
θ¯(λt)
(1− θh (s (θ, x(θ)))) dθ. (13)
Also, note that θ¯(λt) ∈ (0, 1] is implicitly defined as the solution to
F (θ¯, λt) ≡ V˜ I(θ¯, θ¯/2, λt)− V˜ I(θ¯, θ¯, ξ(θ¯)) = 0, (14)
if an interior solution exists. Otherwise, for λt there is a corner solution θ¯(λt) = 1, which
implies V˜ I(1, 1/2, λt) > V˜
I(1, 1, ξ(1)).
First, consider λt > λ¯. Suppose that there exists λ¯, such that for all λt ∈ (λ¯, 1], θ¯(λt)
is a corner solution. Then clearly for all λt > λ¯, ∂θ¯(λt)/∂λt = 0, such that ∂ρ
S(λt)/∂λt =
∂h(s(1/2, λt))/∂λt < 0, by Proposition 1. Furthermore, ∂ρ
R(λt)/∂λt = 0. Otherwise, if there
exists no λ¯, such that for all λt ∈ (λ¯, 1], θ¯(λt) is a corner solution, then there necessarily exists
a λ∗, such that for λt ∈ (λ∗, 1], θ¯(λt) is an interior solution. But then, because it is trivially
true that ρS(1) = ρR(1) = 0, continuity of ρS and ρR implies that ∂ρS(λt)/∂λt < 0 and
∂ρR(λt)/∂λt < 0 for all λt > λ¯ and some λ¯ < 1, proving the first sentence of the proposition.
Now consider λt <
¯
λ. By Proposition 2, θ¯(λt) > 0 for all λt and, hence, s(θ¯(λt)/2, λt) > 0
for all λt < 1 by Proposition 1. Hence the first term in (12) integrates to a strictly positive
number for all λt < 1, proving the second sentence of the proposition.
Regarding the third sentence in the proposition, now further let θ¯(0) < 1. Then, F
differentiable implies that θ¯(λt) has an interior solution and is differentiable for all λt ∈ [0, λ∗)
for some λ∗ > 0. Implicit differentiation of F , substituting for x′(θ¯) from (8), and using
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F (θ¯, λt) = 0 yields
∂θ¯(λ)
∂λ
=
−θ¯hp1sp2up + (1− pp)up1
θ¯
2h
p
1s
p
1u
p + u
p−us
θ¯
, (15)
where subscript i denotes the derivative with respect to the ith argument, and superscripts p
and s denote that the function is evaluated at the pooling or separating values, respectively
(where θˆp = θ¯2 , x
p = λ and θˆs = θ¯, xs = x(θ¯)).
Using this, the signs of ∂ρS/∂λt and ∂ρ
I/∂λt are given by
sign
{
∂ρS(λt)
∂λt
}
= sign
{
uP
(
(pP − pS)(1− 2pS)
1− pS
)
+ (1 − pP )uP1
(
(1− λt)− 2(p
P − pS)
θ¯hP1 s
P
2
)}
(16)
and
sign
{
∂ρR(λt)
∂λt
}
= sign
{
−∂θ¯(λt)
∂λt
(1− pS)
}
, (17)
where we have used that (1− pP )uP = (1− pS)uS from (14) and sP1 /(−sP2 ) = 2(1− λt)/θ¯ by
the proof of Proposition 1.
Evaluated at λt = 0, all terms except u1 in (16) are strictly positive.
27 Thus, ∂ρS(0)/∂λt
is weakly positive if and only if for λt = 0 it holds that
uP1 ≥ −uP
(
(pP − pS)(1− 2pS)
1− pS
)[
(1− pP )
(
(1− λt)− 2(p
P − pS)
θ¯hP1 s
P
2
)]−1
. (18)
Likewise, note that the sign of ∂ρR/∂λt is the opposite sign of ∂θ¯(λt)/∂λt. Hence, because
all terms except u1 in (15) are strictly positive, ∂ρ
R/∂λt is weakly negative if and only if
uP1 ≥ θ¯hp1sp2up(1− pP )−1. (19)
Let u′ and u′′ be the values of the right hand sides of (18) and (19) when evaluated at
λt = 0. Then, from our discussion above it follows, that ∂ρ
S(0)/∂λt > 0 and ∂ρ
R(0)/∂λt < 0 if
u1(0) > u¯ ≡ max{u′, u′′}. The converse—that is, ∂ρS(0)/∂λt < 0 and ∂ρR(0)/∂λt > 0—holds
27Note that pS = θ¯h(sS) < 1/2 for λt = 0 is not obvious. To see that this is indeed the case, assume
to the contrary pS > 1/2 implying pP = θ¯/2h(sP ) > 1/2. By Proposition 4, sP = θ¯/2h(sP )u(sP ) =
pP /2u(sP ) < 1/2 and hence u(sP ) < 1/pP < 2 by pP > 1/2. Furthermore, optimality of ξ¯ ≡ ξ(θ¯)
requires (1 − pS)u(ξ¯) ≥ 1, since an indirect utility of 1 is always attainable by setting x = 1. This
implies u(ξ¯) ≥ 2 by pS > 1/2. Thus, pS > 1/2 implies u(sP ) < 2 ≤ u(ξ¯) for λt = 0. However, by
Proposition 4, sP < 1/2 < ξ¯ such that u(sP ) > u(ξ¯), a contradiction.
42
true, if u1(0) <
¯
u ≡ min{u′, u′′}. Differentiability of ρS and ρR around 0 thus establishes the
claim for all λt ∈ [0,
¯
λ] for some
¯
λ > 0. Q.E.D.
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